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TOPIC:  "DOES  THE  LEGAL  SYSTEM  ESTABLISHED  BY  THE  U.S. 
LEGISLATURE  PROVIDE  AN  OPPORUTNITY  TO  ENSURE  THAT 
THE  INTERESTS  OF  EUROPE  ARE  PROTECTED." 1
The  question which  I  am  to  talk  about  today is whether 
the u.s.  legal system for  trade is responsive  to  the 
legitimate interests of  the E.C. 
= 
If I  had to  answer  this question in one  word,  I  would 
have  to  say:  yes.  By  and  large,  U.S.  trade  legislation 
does  provide  an  opportunity  to ensure that the interests of 
Europe  are protected.  And  yet,  the  fear persists that the 
rather perfectionist legalistic approach  traditionally adopted 
in this  country when  dealing with  trade policy problems  might 
not always  generate  the  greater degree  of  legal certainty and 
protection it is supposed  to  create  - it might  even  sometimes 
act as  a  technical obstacle  to  trade.  I  said:  the  fear persists, 
and  I  have  to qualify this since  the  Community  did  accept  the 
results of  the  Tokyo  Round  in December  1979,  and  thereby 
recognized  - with  some  qualifications  as  to its actual inter-
pretation  - that U.S.  trade  legislation is consistent with  the 
newly  worded  GATT  provisions.  I  should  add  that during_l980  -
a  period marked  by  a  rapidly  growing European  trade deficit 
with  the  U.S.  - the  Community  had little if anything,  to 
complain  about the way  in which  the  new  trade  laws  were  implemented 
by  the  U.S.  authorities.  However,  the massive  antidumping 
complaints  brought  against European  steel producers,  their 
possible affect on  U.S.-E.C.  trade  and  the  way  they were -2-
resolved are  indicative of the  limits of  a  wholly legalistic 
approach.  I  might  come  back  to this  case if time  allows.  The 
same  is true  for  the  recent automobile  case  where  the  courageous 
no-injury finding  by  the  ITC  has  not put  an  end  to  the 
discussion on  possible  trade  restrictions. 
Before  doing so,  I  should like  to  make  some  comments 
on  u.s.  trade  laws  as  they  are  now  worded  as  a  result of the 
successful  conclusion of  the  MT~. 
I  think  that the results of  the  Tokyo  Round will  improve 
opportunities  for both  the E.C.  and  the  u.s.  to protect their 
• 
trading interests in each other's market.  These  results are 
well  known.  They  led to  new  antidumping  and  subsidy  codes 
which  - inter alia - establish  (or  confirm)  the  requirement 
of  an  injury test in cases  of subsidization as  well  as  dumping; 
lay  down  more  realistic rules  on  causality by  abandoning  the 
principal  cause  criterion;  and  give  more  detailed rules  on 
subsidization.  The  Codes  also provide  for  more  transparent 
procedures  to be  applied,  and  lay down  more  detailed rules 
on  price undertakings,  thereby increasing their importance 
as  antidumping or countervailing measures. 
In  contrast to what happened after the  Kennedy  Round, 
the  material  injury criterion has  now  been  introduced into 
U.S.  antidumping  and  countervailing duty  legislation.  Furthermore, 
with  respect to customs  valuation,  the  E.C.  obtained  the 
elimination of  the  ASP,  and  a  general  improvement of  customs 
valuation principles,  an  equilibrium of rights  and  obligations -3-
for all signatories  thus  being established.  The  Community 
undertook  to  rewrite its own  rules  on  protection against 
dumping  or subsidization which,  like  the  u.s.  TAA  of  1979  are 
based  on  the  new  GATT  Codes.  Moreover,  when  drafting these 
instruments  the opportunity was  taken  to  lay  down  more 
precise rules  in those  areas  where  previous  experiences  had 
shown  this  to be  desirable.  This  has  resulted in  a  greater 
degree  of correlation between  U.S.  and European  legislation, 
both in  terms  of procedure  and on matters of substance. 
Some  important ~ifferences remain  though,  and  any  comments 
on  u.s.  trade  legislation may best be  made  by  dwelling shortly 
on  these  differences.  These  tend to  show  that the  U.S.  system 
is more  rigid - for better or worse  - than  its European 
counterpart. 
Perhaps  the most basic difference  now  existing between 
community  and  the  u.s.  law  in this  area is that Community 
law is more  discretionary. 
This  discretion stems  from  two  requirements:  the  need  to 
take  account of the  public interest when  deciding whether 
antidumping or countervailing action should be  taken,  and  the 
need  to  limit the  amount of  any  duty  imposed  to  that required 
to  remedy  the injury caused.  In contrast,  u.s.  law  is 
mandatory  in  these  respects  and,  providing  that dumping or 
subsidization  together with  injury have  been  determined,  then -4-
the  u.s.  Administration must  impose  a  duty  corresponding 
to  the  margin of dumping  or subsidization  found. 
The  requirement of  a  public interest test is not 
purely  nominal,  but of  a  highly practical and political nature. 
It reflects  the  fact that  antidumping  and  countervailing 
measures  are  regarded  as  important instruments of policy and 
not  as  a  means  to protect an  industry whose  monopolistic 
or cartel situation is endangered by  low priced imports, 
or whose  collective output is insufficient to  supply  the  full 
Community market,  <2_r  whose  prices are  not  competiti~e. 
The  need  to limit the  amount of  the  duty  to  that required 
to  remedy  injury reflects  the  Community  view  that no  European 
industry should be  over protected. 
Another  difference exists with  respect to  the  calculation 
of dumping margins. 
When  constructing  a  normal  value  the  minimum  rates  to  be 
;:::.pplied  under  '~. S.  la.-.J  a:::.-e  lC'  ;e:~e::·al  e::penses  and  8% 
for profits.  European  law,  on  the  other hand,  follows  the  GATT 
view  that  the  margin  for overheads  must  be  reasonable  and  the 
allowance  for profit should not exceed  the  rate normally 
realized in  the  exporting country.  As  the  normal  rate of profit 
varies  from  country  to  country  and from  product to product, 
as  well  as with  the  general  economic  climate,  the  application -5-
of mandatory  minimum  rates  could  lead  to arbitrary and 
ineq~itable results. 
Detailed rules  are  set out in  the  Subsidy  Code  on  the 
procedures  to  be  applied when  dealing with  subsidization, 
and  the methods  by which  the  amount  of the  subsidy  should be 
calculated.  The  Community,  like  the u.s.,  has  incorporated 
these  rules  into its legislation,  along with  the  illustrative 
list of export subsidies,  ensuring  a  certain degree  of 
consistency between  the  u.s.  and  the  E.C. 
There  are  grounds,  however,  for fearing  that there  may 
be  a  difference in  the  method of calculating the net amount 
of  domestic  subsidies.  It will be  recalled that,  since  the 
Michelin  case,  the  U.S.  Treasury  has  consistently held  the  view 
that domestic subsidies  are  countervailable only if either a 
preponderance of the merchandise  receiving benefits  from  the 
program is exported,  or the  ad  valorem  amount of the  benefit 
is  large.  For  the  purpose  of establishing  the  amount  of  the 
net subsidy,  dislocation  and other costs  incurred in order  to 
qualify for  the  subsidy were  conducted  from  the  aid given. 
There  is  no  express  provision  for  the  deduction  of 
dislocation  and other costs  in the  1979  Trade  Agreements  Act, 
which  gives  a  relatively broad  and extensive definition of 
domestic subsidy. - 6  -
Only  time will tell whether in u.s.  law  those  factors  having 
no  distorting effects  on  trade,  and  designed only to  compensate 
!=irms  for  certain disadvantaqes  endured,  will be  deductible 
from  the  gross  amount  of the  subsidy.  Under  European  law,  however, 
all costs necessarily incurred in order to qualify for  the 
domestic  subsidy  (including the  costs of  the  disadvantages)  are 
deductible. 
The  new  GATT  Codes  provide  for  a  mandatory material  injury 
test to  be  applied both  for  dumping  and  subsidization.  They 
also contain realist1c rules  on  causality,  on  the  definition of 
injury and  on  the criteria to  be  applied when  establishing injury. 
Most  of these provisions  have  been  incorporated into  the  u.s.  law 
and regulations  and into Community  law. 
There is,  however,  one  nuance  of interpretation concerning 
the  definition of  "material".  Whereas  the  Community  has  always 
applied  a  positive material  injury test and  considers  that injury 
r  , 
s.bould  be  important',  the  1979  Trade Agreement  Act defines material 
injury as  harm which  is not  inconsequential,  immaterial or 
unimportant.  It is to be  hoped  that the differnce  between 
a  positive  and  a  negative  test will  cause  no  major problems 
in the  future. 